The Deflationary Theory of Ontological Dependence by Kovacs, David Mark
 1 
	
The Deflationary Theory of Ontological Dependence 
By David Mark Kovacs 
(this is a draft; please cite the version forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly!) 
 
Abstract. When an entity ontologically depends on another entity, the former 
“presupposes” or “requires” the latter in some metaphysical sense. This paper 
defends a novel view, Dependence Deflationism, according to which 
ontological dependence is what I call an aggregative cluster concept: a concept 
which can be understood, but not fully analyzed, as a “weighted total” of 
constructive (roughly: mereological in the broadest possible sense) and modal 
relations. The view has several benefits: it accounts for clear cases of 
ontological dependence as well as the source of disagreement in controversial 
ones; it gives a nice story about the evidential relevance of modal, mereological 
and set-theoretic facts to ontological dependence; and it makes sense of debates 
over the relation’s formal properties. One important upshot of the deflationary 
account is that questions of ontological dependence are generally less deep and 
less interesting than usually thought. 
 
Keywords: cluster concepts, deflationary ontology, determination, grounding, 
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1. Introduction 
When some x ontologically depends on some y, x in some metaphysical sense 
“requires” or “presupposes” y: sets are thought to depend on their members, wholes 
on their parts, structured facts on their constituents, tropes on their bearers, holes on 
their hosts, and so on. Ontological independence has traditionally been regarded as a 
criterion of metaphysical self-sufficiency, and for this reason sometimes also of 
substancehood. Recent years witnessed a surging interest in ontological dependence.1 
I should flag at the outset that ‘dependence’ has also been used in a broader 
sense in metaphysics. Functional realisation, micro-basing, and most recently 
grounding, are sometimes described as “dependence relations”, though it would be 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Simons (1982), Mulligan, Simons & Smith (1984), Fine (1995), Correia (2005), and Koslicki 
(2012). 
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more accurate to call these determination relations.2 If ontological dependence is a kind 
of presupposition, determinative notions are linked to a kind of metaphysical 
explanation. Although dependence and determination have something in common (they 
both impose a kind of non-causal priority), it’s a mistake to automatically assume 
that x determines y iff y ontologically depends on x. To begin with, there are 
plausible counterexamples to both sides of this biconditional. Against the “only if” 
part: disjunctive facts are widely thought to be grounded (and so determined) by 
their true disjuncts, but they don’t always depend on this disjunct. For example, 
Pv~P may be determined by contingent fact P but doesn’t depend on it; the 
disjunction is a logical truth and doesn’t “need” or “presuppose” such contingent 
facts in any way. Against the “if” part: suppose facts ontologically depend on their 
constituent individuals and properties (cf. section 5). Take an arbitrary fundamental 
fact, e.g. that a certain electron has negative charge. This fact may ontologically 
depend on its constituents, but since it’s a fundamental fact, it lacks a metaphysical 
explanation and so isn’t determined by anything (given a widespread definition of 
fundamentality).3 
The aforementioned cases are resistible, as counterexamples usually are. But 
there is also a general reason why dependence isn’t the converse of determination. 
Ontological dependence involves a (perhaps, but not obviously, modal) constraining 
of the prior thing by the posterior thing. By contrast, determination relations involve 
                                                
2 See Melnyk (2003: Ch. 1), Kim (1998: 80–7), and Bliss and Trogdon (2014), respectively, for 
introductions to these relations. 
3 See also Schnieder (forthcoming: §4.6) for further counterexamples to a similar equivalence thesis 
(he uses slightly different terminology). 
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a similar constraining of the posterior thing by the prior thing. This constraining runs 
in opposite directions in the two cases, and we shouldn’t simply assume that they 
systematically coincide.  
Perhaps there is some subtler connection between grounding and ontological 
dependence4; here I just warn against their straightforward conflation. In the present 
work, I will exclusively focus on ontological dependence: the kind of metaphysical 
presupposition/constraining that can be traced back at least to Aristotle and was 
later revived by Husserl – not grounding, not non-causal explanation, and not 
“dependence relations”. 
Until recently, most philosophers offered analyses of ontological dependence in 
terms that were usually thought better understood than the idioms of dependence (in 
what follows: a conservative analysis). For example, taking inspiration from Husserl, 
Simons (1982) developed a modal-mereological account of ontological dependence. 
More recently, Brian Ellis proposed a supervenience-based definition (2001: 82–3). 
However, by far the most well-known such account has been the 
 
(Modal Analysis): For any x and y, x ontologically depends on y iff, 
necessarily, if x exists then y exists.5 
 
Unfortunately, the Modal Analysis is subject to counterexamples. For instance, as 
Fine (1995: 271) has pointed out, it implies that Socrates ontologically depends on 
                                                
4 See Correia (2005: 66), Tahko and Lowe (2015: §5), Jansson (2017: 34–9), and Schnieder 
(forthcoming: §3, §5.1) 
5 Moravcsik (1965: 107), Tlumak (1983), Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1994: 95–6), Simons (1998: 236) 
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his singleton set, and that everything ontologically depends on any necessary existent 
(e.g. Socrates on the number five).6 Most philosophers find these consequences 
unacceptable, and as a result either accept ontological dependence as an indispensible 
primitive7 or analyze it in terms of a non-modal notion of essence8 or grounding9. In 
what follows, I will collectively refer to these as heavyweight approaches. 
Since heavyweight views presuppose controversial pieces of ideology, 
conservative alternatives are of considerable interest.10 For one, notions like necessity 
and parthood are often considered well understood and independently needed. For 
another, while ontological dependence requires a sui generis epistemology on 
heavyweight views, conservative accounts allow us to refer back to the epistemology 
of the analysans notions.11 
One alternative to the heavyweight orthodoxy is that the very notion of 
ontological dependence is unintelligible.12 I don’t find this promising (unintelligibility 
claims are generally hard to defend). A less radical approach would be to understand 
ontological dependence in relatively uncontroversial terms we already need for other 
purposes. This was the ambition of the Modal Analysis, and is also what I will try to 
                                                
6 See also Correia (2005: 39–46) 
7 Thomasson (1999: Ch. 2), Potter (2004: 39–40), and Barnes (2012: 879) 
8 Fine (1995: 273); cf. Fine (1994), Koslicki (2012) 
9 Correia (2005: 66) 
10 My own view, which I won’t defend here, is that the notion of grounding is explanatorily redundant 
Kovacs 2017), and that pace Fine, essence is amenable to a straightforward modal analysis. On the 
latter count, I’m influenced by Cowling 2013; see also Wildman 2013. 
11 Cf. Hofweber (2009: 273–4) 
12 Daly 2012: (99–100); cf. Hofweber (2009) 
 5 
	
do. I will defend Dependence Deflationism, the view that ontological dependence can be 
explained in modal and broadly constructive terms (I will later explain what the latter 
means). I will argue that while these concepts cannot give us a reductive analysis of 
ontological dependence, in an important sense they can make the notion fully 
intelligible. I won’t try to persuade committed heavyweight theorists to prefer this 
view to their own, but I hope to convince them that the theory deserves their 
attention. 
The rest of the paper will go as follows. Section 2 will explain the notion of an 
aggregative cluster concept, a concept that can be understood, but not fully analyzed, 
in terms of the various relations it “aggregates”. Section 3 will propose the 
hypothesis that ontological dependence is an aggregative cluster of modal and 
constructive relations. In section 4, I will test this hypothesis against several examples 
and argue that it can account not only for clear cases of ontological dependence but 
also for the source of disagreement in controversial ones. In section 5, I will offer 
two supplementary arguments for my view, one revolving around the epistemology 
of ontological dependence and another based on the relation’s formal properties. 
Before proceeding, I should make explicit two methodological assumptions. 
First: some philosophers (“pluralists”) distinguish various kinds of ontological 
dependence: rigid and generic, de re and de dicto, existential and essential, etc.13 Others 
(“generalists”) simply talk about ontological dependence and don’t make these 
                                                
13 Lowe (1994), Thomasson (1999: Ch. 2), Correia (2005, 2008), Schnieder (2006), Koslicki (2012, 
2013), and Tahko and Lowe (2015) 
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distinctions.14 Though I have something to say about the specific types, I will mostly 
focus on the general notion, for two reasons. First, though the generalist conception 
will be my starting point, ultimately I won’t rely on it: as I will show in section 3, 
Deflationism can also account for various species of ontological dependence. 
Second, I will argue in section 5.2 that the main motivation for pluralism stems from 
problems with generalism my view can handle at least as well. 
Second: I aim to provide an account that can accommodate a wide range of 
views about what depends on what, but the theory is not intended as a neutral arbiter 
consistent with any first-order position.15 For example, since I reject non-modal 
notions of essence, one would search in vain for a discussion of essential dependence 
in this paper. When speaking of ontological dependence, I’m interested in a concept 
that strikes a good balance between fitting our intuitions and certain theoretical 
desiderata. Such desiderata include conceptual links to other metaphysical notions, 
flexibility about the relation’s formal properties, and a simple epistemology. While I 
think the deflationary view does well on these counts, it might end up capturing 
something that doesn’t completely coincide with the standing notion of ontological 
dependence. In that case, you should read this paper in a revisionary spirit: we should 
use ‘ontological dependence’ to express the concept I will describe, since the 
theoretical benefits are worth it. 
 
2. Aggregative cluster concepts 
                                                
14 Cameron (2008), Schaffer (2009), Paseau (2010), Jenkins (2011), and Barnes (2012, forthcoming) 
15 Thus my approach is closer to Peramatzis’s (2011) than to Correia’s (2005: 9–11). 
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An important class of concepts – aggregative clusters, as I shall call them – can be 
understood as “weighted totals” of certain relations, in terms of which they 
nonetheless cannot be analyzed. Consider is bigger than. Whether some x is bigger 
than some y is a function of various factors having to do with comparative size. 
Simplifying somewhat, let’s say it’s a function of the pattern in which they instantiate 
is taller than, is wider than, is longer than, and is heavier than. Call these relative bigness factors. 
When x and y instantiate a relative bigness factor, this speaks in favour of (but 
doesn’t entail) x being all things considered bigger than y. Call the set of principles 
telling us how the relative bigness factors between any x and y weigh against each 
other the rules of aggregation. Of course, the concept shows a certain amount of 
indeterminacy, as there is no fully specific set of rules governing it. But some cases 
are obvious: for instance, if x is longer, taller, wider and heavier than y, it’s also 
bigger. 
This preliminary characterisation needs some adjustments. First, to figure out 
whether some x is bigger than some y it’s not enough to know whether x is taller, 
heavier, longer, or wider than y. It also matters how much taller, heavier, longer or 
wider x is. I take it that this is an accidental feature of is bigger than, not an essential 
feature of aggregative clusters, and results from the fact that most of the properties 
we are in the habit of referring to are gradable. In what follows, I will ignore the 
gradability of the relative bigness factors, since this feature of the example is 
irrelevant to my present purposes (however, see footnote 26). 
Second, whether is bigger than applies on an occasion is sensitive to whether the 
putative relata instantiate relations along sufficiently many dimensions. These 
relations don’t necessarily have to be relative bigness factors; they could also be 
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symmetric relations in the vicinity, for example being as long as or being as heavy as. If 
there are too many dimensions along which two entities instantiate no comparative 
size relation (too many unsaturated dimensions), they won’t stand in any all-in relative 
bigness relation. For example, no ordinary object stands in any such relation with the 
empty set, since they don’t instantiate relative bigness factors along any dimension. 
More controversially, compare a 1.25x1.25 feet two-dimensional surface with an 
ordinary bowling ball. I would say that the surface and the ball bear no comparative 
all-in size relation to each other because there are too many unsaturated relative 
bigness dimensions between them. 
Bearing these qualifications in mind, we can say that is bigger than is an 
aggregative cluster that applies to some x and y just in case taking into consideration 
their weight, height, length, width, x is all things considered bigger than y. It’s 
reasonably clear why these factors yield a notion of all-in comparative size: to be 
heavier is to be bigger with respect to weight, to be longer is to be bigger with 
respect to length (etc.), and to be bigger simpliciter is to be bigger all things 
considered.16 But why is it that it’s these factors, rather than some others, that yield an 
all-things-considered notion of relative bigness? After all, weight and extension are 
                                                
16 An anonymous referee reports different intuitions about a cognate notion I used in an earlier 
version, is larger than, and thinks that to be larger than something is simply to have greater volume. I 
find ‘is bigger than’ harder to hear so as to only track relative differences in volume; to those who 
disagree, the best I can offer are counterexamples. Here’s one: when sensing danger, various species 
of animals inflate themselves. We colloquially say that when they do so, they look bigger, which 
strongly implicates that they don’t actually get bigger. But they would if ‘is bigger than’ simply meant 
having greater volume. 
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very different kinds of dimensions, so we shouldn’t expect them to yield a 
particularly unified relation. The answer is that, so far as I can see, this is how the 
concept works in ordinary discourse. Our judgments of relative bigness are indeed a 
mishmash of judgments about such disparate relations; as a result, the concept is 
rarely used in theoretical contexts but may still serve as a useful heuristic, absent 
more precise means of comparison. 
Since this characterisation of is bigger than leaves the rules of aggregation 
unspecified, it doesn’t amount to a reductive analysis. Still, there is an important link 
between is bigger than and the relations it aggregates: the former can be explained in 
terms of the latter, where the force of ‘explanation’ is conceptual. This is primarily an 
epistemological thesis: it implies that is bigger than can be made intelligible in terms of 
the relations it aggregates. Suppose someone describes two animals you have never 
heard of, A and B. Knowledge of the comparative relations of mass, height, length 
and width between them would put you in a position to know, within the limitations set 
by the indeterminacy in the rules of aggregation, whether A is bigger than B. This last 
qualification is important because there are cases in which even once all the factors 
are in, you couldn’t decide whether A is bigger than B. Importantly, such cases can 
exist even if you are fully competent with the concept is bigness than. Perhaps if there 
were further rules guiding our use, you would be able to decide whether x is bigger 
than y. But there aren’t, so in certain cases you cannot possibly know whether the 
concept applies to an ordered pair.17 
                                                
17 Following an anonymous referee’s suggestion, I note that the situation is analogous to the Problem 
of the Many. Even if being fully competent with the concept chair implies that we know there is only 
 10 
	
Given the large number of ways in which the rules of aggregation for relative 
bigness could have been specified, it’s natural to think about the hard cases in the 
following way. There are lots of abundant relations in the vicinity of is bigger than.18 
They aggregate the same factors but differ in how much weight they assign to them: 
for instance, being bigger than1 treats height as more significant, being bigger than2 
assigns more importance to weight, etc. Moreover, it’s indeterminate which of these 
relations ‘is bigger than’ refers to. In borderline cases, the rules of aggregation could 
be made more precise in ways compatible with either verdict. ‘Is bigger than’ also 
plausibly displays a certain amount of context-sensitivity: it expresses different 
abundant relations in different contexts, each with its own weighing of relative 
bigness factors. (Note that this is compatible with the claim that the expression picks 
out an aggregative cluster concept even within each context.) 
To demonstrate some features of aggregative clusters, I used the example of is 
bigger than. Many other notions also carry the mark of aggregative clusters; examples 
may include beating in a battle, colouring, spicing up, and others. But why worry so much 
about these concepts? Aggregative clusters provide an interesting case study of how 
conceptual unanalysability can come apart from theoretical indispensability.19 
Relative bigness is a case in point: in theoretical contexts, any information conveyed 
in terms of relative bigness could be conveyed more accurately in terms of the 
relative bigness factors. This doesn’t mean that the concept is completely useless, 
                                                                                                                                
one chair where there is a collection of particles arranged chair-wise, we don’t thereby know which 
particular collection composes a given chair. 
18 See Lewis (1983) on the distinction between sparse and abundant properties and relations. 
19 See Dorr (2004: 157) for similar remarks on predicates that are unanalysable because they are vague. 
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since overall bigness comparisons convey some information, and in certain practical 
settings we care about convenience more than about accuracy. But in theoretical 
contexts, questions about what is bigger than what tend to be less interesting than 
specific questions about comparative size along some particular dimension. 
 
3. Ontological dependence as an aggregative cluster 
Above I characterised aggregative clusters through the example of is bigger than. I now 
propose the hypothesis that ontological dependence, too, is an aggregative cluster concept 
of modal and constructive relations, as listed below: 
 
1) Necessarily, if y exists then x exists (in short: y rigidly 
necessitates x), but not vice versa 
2) Fx and necessarily, if y exists then there is a z such that Fz (in 
short: y generically necessitates x), but not vice versa 
3) x is a constituent of y, but not vice versa 
 
Clauses 1)-3) comprise what I mean by “modal relation”. My use of “constructive 
relation” and “constituent”, however, requires more explanation. 
As a first approximation, take the view that parthood and composition are 
category-neutral relations. On a radical version of this view, the composition relation 
obtains not only between material objects and their proper parts, but also between 
objects and their properties (for example, on a bundle theory of objects), structured 
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facts and their constituent individuals and properties, and even sets and their 
ancestral members.20 
While I’m sympathetic to this radically category-neutral conception of 
composition, I won’t presuppose it. So I will use the word ‘constructive relation’ as a 
general expression for relations that that hold between various types of compound 
entities and their constituents: material composition, ancestral set membership, 
property-bundling, the relation between facts and their individuals and properties, 
and perhaps more. Thus, while a category neutralist can simply say that 3) covers 
asymmetric parthood, category restrictionists can replace this with reference to 
whichever relations category neutralists lump under parthood (restrictionists will 
differ on what these exactly are). The choice between category-neutral and restricted 
views makes no difference to the forthcoming account of ontological dependence. 
Nor does the frequency with which constructive relations are instantiated, though of 
course this does have a bearing on the extent of ontological dependence (e.g., 
ontological dependence is never instantiated between composite material objects and 
their parts if the former don’t exist). 
I think there is an intimate conceptual connection between the relations listed 
under 1)-3) and ontological dependence. A view in the vicinity of mine – 
Deflationary Pluralism, as I will call it – would contend that 1)-3) are a species of 
ontological dependence. According to the view I favour, they are species of another 
                                                
20 See Fine (2010) for the view that ancestral set membership is a kind of parthood; see also Simons 
(1987), Armstrong (1997), McDaniel (2001), and Paul (2002) for other neutralist views. Most category 
neutralists accept compositional pluralism, the (logically independent) view that parthood comes in 
various kinds. 
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(non-ontological) kind of dependence, which licenses ontological dependence claims 
in a more indirect way. I will first present my own view and return to Deflationary 
Pluralism in section 5. 
The relations listed under 1)-3) plausibly track some kind of dependence, even if 
not full-blown ontological dependence. Each of the following claims has some 
attraction: 
 
(a) If the existence of y rigidly necessitates the existence of x, but 
not vice versa, then y rigidly modally depends on x 
(b) If the existence of y generically necessitates the existence of 
x, but not vice versa, then y generically modally depends on x 
(c) If x is a constituent of y, but not vice versa, then y 
constructively depends on y. 
 
As I understand (a)-(c), they state not controversial theses about ontological 
dependence but rather obvious truisms about other notions of dependence. This is 
because they track a sort of hierarchical structure in which the entities higher up 
presuppose and require, in some metaphysical sense, the entities lower down, and 
such structures by themselves license ‘dependence’-talk. 
Take asymmetric rigid and generic asymmetrical necessitation. Before 
encountering Fine’s counterexamples, these were frequently identified with species of 
ontological dependence. If we want to avoid symmetric dependence, the most 
natural view in the modal account’s vicinity would replace them with their asymmetric 
versions (Correia 2005: 35). Moreover, even opponents of the Modal Analysis take 
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seriously the idea that the analysis captures some notion of dependence, if not the 
metaphysically significant notion contemporary metaphysicians are interested in.21 
My point can be buttressed by considering some locutions frequently used to express 
dependence: when A depends on B, A’s existence requires and presupposes the existence 
of B (or something of B’s kind); for A to exist, B (or something of its kind) needs to 
exist; and so on. Fine’s counterexamples taught us not to understand these locutions 
modally; they nonetheless clearly have a purely modal reading. 
It’s harder to argue with full generality that constructive relations convey a sense 
of dependence, since to convince some category restrictionists I would need to go 
through the entire (possibly open-ended) list of constructive relations they 
distinguish from parthood. Instead, I will argue that both asymmetric parthood 
(between material objects) and a relation all category restrictionists distinguish from 
parthood, ancestral set membership, induce a kind of dependence. 
Most philosophers think that wholes ontologically depend on their proper 
parts22, while Schaffer (2010) argues for priority monism, the view that every material 
object ontologically depends on the cosmos. I will discuss this view in section 4; for 
now, I will confine myself to a brief remark. Even if priority monism were true, it 
would remain correct to say that wholes depend on their parts mereologically. In a 
purely mereological sense, proper parts are always prior to the wholes they compose; 
the question is whether priority and dependence in this sense coincide with the 
                                                
21 See, for instance, Correia (2008: 1023), Hoeltje (2013), and Tahko and Lowe (2015: §1); cf. 
Peramatzis (2011: 234–5) on a modal notion of dependence in Aristotle. 
22 See Kim (1994: 67), Conee and Sider (2005: 68), Markosian (2005: §3), Cameron (2014), and Skiles 
(2015). 
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relation of ontological dependence most metaphysicians are interested in.23 If 
Schaffer is correct, then an object’s parts can ontologically depend on the object they 
compose, yet this wouldn’t prevent the whole from also mereologically depending on 
the parts. 
Similar remarks apply to ancestral set membership. In the cumulative hierarchy, 
sets “come after” and “presuppose” their ancestral members. This is a kind of 
dependence, even if not the kind Fine posits between Socrates and his singleton set. 
According to Incurvati’s minimalist view, for instance, there is nothing more to the 
iterative conception of a set than the narrative convention that introduces sets as 
occurring at various levels of the cumulative hierarchy (2012: 82). Incurvati 
emphasizes that this doesn’t imply that sets ontologically depend on their members. I 
agree. But to my mind, the convention does suffice for sets to depend on their 
members in some sense, even if not the ontological sense. For this reason, we can 
say that sets depend on their members at least in a purely set-theoretic sense. 
As I said, (1)-(3) are notions of some kind of dependence, albeit not ontological 
dependence. This is important to emphasize because it also clarifies the sense in 
which my account is reductive and the sense in which it isn’t. If (a)-(c) are correct, 
explaining ontological dependence in terms of 1)-3) can be successful only because 
we already have some understanding of dependence simpliciter. So, we are explaining 
ontological dependence in terms of other kinds of dependence, rather than concepts 
that have nothing to do with dependence. This feature is unobjectionable, and is one 
my account shares with the Modal Analysis. The Modal Analysis was once 
                                                
23 See Hall’s (2010: Supplement) remarks on the “mereological hierarchy”; cf. Paul (2012: 221–2). 
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considered plausible precisely because rigid necessitation is an implicitly dependence-
inducing concept. Fine’s great insight was that this dependence was not of the 
ontological sort we have been looking for (Fine himself would probably disagree 
with this assessment).24 
What about the plethora of “dependence relations” frequently discussed in 
metaphysics as well as in the philosophy of mind, such as micro-based 
determination, functional realisation, or the determinable-determinate relation? 
Shouldn’t they also be treated as implying at least some non-ontological kind of 
dependence and added to our list of 1)-3)? No. Recall that by ‘ontological 
dependence’ I mean the (family of) relation(s) targeted in the specialized literature. 
This differs from the various determination relations often misleadingly branded as 
“dependence relations”. That said, one might want to be more liberal about what 
counts as a dependence factor and still accept a view in the spirit of Deflationism. I 
think such liberal approaches are likely based on conflating dependence and 
determination, but won’t argue the point here. Suffice it so say that I will proceed 
with the meagre list of factors I drew above. 
Two further clarifications before I give the official statement of my view, both 
familiar from section 2. First, although ontological dependence aggregates modal and 
constructive relations, I cannot say exactly how it aggregates them – the rules of 
aggregation are somewhat indeterminate. Second, whether ontological dependence applies 
                                                
24 My point is analogous to one Cameron (2012) made about analysing modality: instead of worrying 
about whether a purported analysis is “implicitly modal”, we should focus on whether the concepts in 
its analysans are concepts in good standing that we need anyway. Mutatis mutandis for accounts of 
ontological dependence (thanks to an anonymous referee for forcing me to be clearer here). 
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to some x and some y is sensitive to whether the putative relata instantiate relations 
along sufficiently many “dependence dimensions”. Similarly to the case of is bigger 
than, symmetric relations in the vicinity of (1)-(3) can saturate a dependence 
dimension between x and y. For example, improper parthood and symmetric rigid or 
generic necessitation don’t contribute to either of x or y ontologically depending on 
the other, but might help establish enough of a connection between them so that 
another relation that qualifies as a dependence factor could tilt the direction either 
way. This phenomenon also helps us understand why Socrates doesn’t ontologically 
depend on the number five: although each dependence factor between them speaks 
in favour of Socrates depending on the number five, no non-modal dependence 
dimension between them is saturated. Hence, there isn’t enough of a connection 
between the two for the modal factors to establish ontological dependence. (In this 
regard, the situation is similar to the case of the two-dimensional surface and the ball 
from section 2.)25 
Now we are in a position to state the deflationary position. Ontological dependence 
is an aggregative cluster concept: a concept that applies to some x and y just in case 
taken into consideration all the dependence factors, x depends on y. How so? Each 
                                                
25 Should we say that ontological dependence always requires the presence of some constructive 
dependence factor? I’m undecided: I’m reluctant to build such a strong claim into the official theory, 
but it’s hard to think of counterexamples. An anonymous referee suggests that physicalists might say 
that a phenomenal experience depends on a brain state without the two instantiating any constructive 
relation. I’m not convinced; I think the proper physicalist doctrine is that phenomenal states are 
determined by brain states, not that they depend on them. This is especially plausible on non-reductive 
views, which allow for multiple realisability. 
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of 1)-3) by itself implies some kind of dependence, and we can aggregate these to get 
an all-things-considered notion. So, just like with other aggregative clusters, the 
relation between ontological dependence and the dependence factors is conceptual 
explanation. This implies that complete knowledge of the pattern of modal and 
constructive relations by x and y would put you in a position to know, within the 
constraints posed by the indeterminacy in the rules of aggregation, whether x 
ontologically depends on y.26 
By now it should also be clear what makes this view deflationary. My 
dependence factors don’t form a very unified class; analogously to ‘is bigger than’, 
judgments of ontological dependence turn out to be a mishmash of judgments about 
modal and constructive relations. Moreover, since we could have specified the rules 
of aggregation in a number of ways, the aggregate notion displays some 
indeterminacy. But then, any question of the form “Does x ontologically depend on 
y?” ultimately boils down to two sub-questions. First, which dependence factors are 
instantiated in the case at hand? This question is metaphysical, but it can be 
addressed without any mention of ontological dependence itself; all we need to focus 
                                                
26 In section 2, I put to the side the complication that relative bigness admits of degrees. It’s worth 
pointing out that the disanalogy with ontological dependence is less clear-cut here than appears at first 
glance, since one might want to allow for indeterminate parthood, fuzzy set membership, and even 
indeterminately true modal claims. This would lead to a notion of ontological dependence that admits 
of degrees. Koslicki (2015: 127) has recently argued that the (historically related) notion of substance 
admits of degrees, and also attributed that view to Aristotle. Unfortunately, I lack space to explore this 
issue in further detail here; in the main text, I will keep focusing on the all-or-nothing notions of 
ontological dependence and the dependence factors. 
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on are the patterns of modal and constructive relations instantiated by the putative 
relata. Second, what do the rules of aggregation say about how these relations should 
be weighed against each other? This question is semantic/conceptual, and no deeper 
than the analogous question about is bigger than. In light of these considerations, we 
can say that the account of ontological dependence I’m offering is deflationary or 
“lightweight”.27 
The general characterisation of Deflationism ends here. This is a good place to 
say a few words about the specific types of ontological dependence pluralists often 
distinguish in the literature. Barnes (forthcoming) has recently argued that these 
distinctions are arbitrary and best seen as attempts to explain away counterexamples 
to the asymmetry of ontological dependence. I agree that the standard distinctions 
are rather arbitrary, and now we can also explain why: they result from singling out a 
relation within an aggregative cluster and imposing it on the cluster. For example, 
rigid existential dependence can be defined as follows: 
 
x rigidly depends on y =def (1) x ontologically depends on y, (2) the 
existence of x rigidly necessitates the existence of y 
 
Thus understood, rigid dependence is on par with is bigger and taller than – an admittedly 
artificial-looking concept. However, as we will see in Section 5.2, we don’t need such 
distinctions to resist putative counterexamples to asymmetry. Not that we have to 
                                                
27 Notice the analogy with modal neo-conventionalism (Cameron 2010, Sider 2011: Ch. 12), according 
to which there are plenty of different things we could have meant by ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, etc., and 
the way we use these words isn’t superior to other, non-actual, uses. 
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resist them; Deflationism can accommodate a wide variety of views about the formal 
properties of ontological dependence. But I’m getting ahead of myself. Let’s see first 
how the theory fares in practice. 
 
4. Dependence Deflationism at work: some cases 
In this section, I will discuss some putative cases of ontological dependence. My goal 
is to illustrate that Deflationism fits our intuitive judgments of ontological 
dependence and can also explain disagreement over controversial cases. 
A. Socrates and {Socrates}. Intuitively, {Socrates} ontologically depends on 
Socrates, but not vice versa. There is a constructive dependence factor: Socrates is an 
ancestral member of {Socrates}, but not the other way round. Moreover, there is a 
modal connection that isn’t a dependence factor but saturates a dependence 
dimension (and thus prevents a situation in which there aren’t enough saturated 
dependence dimensions): Socrates and {Socrates} rigidly necessitate each other. 
Finally, no dependence factor favours the dependence of Socrates on {Socrates}. So, 
we have a good case for thinking that {Socrates} ontologically depends on Socrates. 
This is one of the most uncontroversial cases of ontological dependence: the 
few who deny that Socrates ontologically depends on {Socrates} do so due to their 
general scepticism about the notion (e.g. Incurvati 2012). I think this is no 
coincidence: the ontological dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates is 
uncontroversial because the dependence factors they instantiate are uncontroversial 
and unambiguously point in the direction of {Socrates} depending on Socrates. 
B. Priority monism vs. priority pluralism. A more controversial case is the 
ontological dependence of material wholes on their parts. To simplify things a bit, I 
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will focus on two restricted theses that are relatively easy to contrast: the view that 
the cosmos ontologically depends on its simple parts (call it pluratomism), and the 
view that every simple ontologically depends on the cosmos (call it monatomism).28 
Which dependence factors speak in favour of which thesis? Most obviously, 
there is a constructive dependence factor that speaks in favour of pluratomism: the 
cosmos is composed of the simples. What about the modal dependence factors? 
That hangs on whether there are “gunky” worlds that contain infinitely divisible 
objects (gunk) and “junky” worlds with no maximal mereological sum to qualify as 
the cosmos. If there are no gunky worlds, the cosmos generically necessitates the 
simples. And if there are no junky worlds, the simples generically necessitate the 
existence the cosmos. If generic necessitation goes only in the first direction, that’s a 
dependence factor in favour of pluratomism; if only in the second direction, that’s a 
dependence factor in favour of monatomism; and if it goes both ways, that saturates 
a dependence dimension without tilting the direction of dependence either way. 
Thus we get the best distribution of dependence factors for pluratomism if there 
are junky but no gunky worlds, and for monatomism if there are gunky but no junky 
worlds. In the latter case, we have only one dependence factor (composition) 
supporting the dependence of the cosmos on its simple parts, and another one 
supporting the dependence of the simple parts on the cosmos. 
Now, Schaffer (2010: 61–5) offers an argument for priority monism, the view that 
every proper part of the cosmos depends ontologically on the cosmos, based on the 
                                                
28 I will assume that there are simples and that mereological essentialism is false. Relaxing these 
assumptions would make the discussion more complicated in tangential ways. 
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possibility of gunk and the impossibility of junk.29 So, the above result shouldn’t be 
too surprising, although it ought to be qualified in two ways. First, Schaffer’s gives 
several other arguments for priority monism, which rely on substantive links between 
fundamentality and other metaphysical relations, for example emergence (2010: 55–
57). My deflationary framework cannot make sense of these arguments, but I don’t 
think it should, either. Schaffer doesn’t recognize my distinction between grounding 
and ontological dependence, and uses ‘grounding’ and ‘dependence’-talk more or less 
interchangeably. As a result, he conflates two distinct theses: (1) that the proper parts 
of the cosmos ontologically depend on the cosmos, and that (2) (facts about) the 
proper parts of the cosmos are grounded in (facts about) the cosmos. The argument 
from gunk is naturally construed as supporting the first thesis, whereas Schaffer’s 
other arguments concern grounding/determination, rather than ontological 
dependence strictly understood. 
While Dependence Deflationary confirms that whether gunk, but not junk, is 
possible is relevant to the debate, it doesn’t imply that such a combination would 
settle the debate in Schaffer’s favour – rather, it would leave us with one dependence 
factor supporting monatomism and another one speaking against it. I consider this 
the right result. For even if Schaffer turned out to be right about the relevant modal 
and mereological facts, pluratomism wouldn’t stop seeming somewhat plausible. The 
previous section suggests an explanation of why this is so. There are many abundant 
relations that could have been meant by ‘ontological dependence’. If Schaffer is right 
about the direction of ontological dependence, this is because the rules of 
                                                
29 Bohn (2009) objects to the argument on the basis that if gunk is possible, so is junk. 
 23 
	
aggregation happen to assign more weight to generic necessitation than to 
asymmetric parthood (of course, Schaffer himself would disagree with this 
diagnosis). 
I don’t know whether this is the case; through the lens of Deflationism, it 
doesn’t really matter. For the deflationist, once all the modal and constructive facts 
are settled, asking what depends ontologically on what is like investing a lot of time 
and money in comparing the mass, diameter and volume of two planets and, once all 
the data are in, pressing the question: “Okay, but which one is bigger?” 
C. Tropes and their bearers. Tropes are often thought to ontologically depend 
on their bearers, but only by those who believe that tropes are non-transferable: 
necessarily, if a trope exists then so does its bearer, whereas the bearer could exist 
without most of its tropes.30 Matters are less straightforward in the case of necessary 
tropes. Some, like Simons (1994), argue that trope-bearers and their necessary tropes 
mutually ontologically depend on each other. I reject this possibility (though see 
section 5.2), but I’m sympathetic to the idea that the rigid necessitation of a 
necessary trope by its bearer weakens the case for its ontological dependence on that 
bearer. 
The importance of modal connections becomes even more evident when we 
focus on views that deny the non-transferability thesis. These come in many 
flavours31; what matters is that their advocates tend to think of tropes as the most 
                                                
30 Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984: 290–1), Simons (1987: 304), Correia (2008: 1015–6), Koslicki 
(2012: 201), Tahko and Lowe (2015: §6.3) 
31 See Williams (1953), Campbell (1981, 1990), Schaffer (2003), and Cameron (2006), among others. 
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basic kinds of things32, and of material objects as bundles of tropes. I cannot get into 
further details here; suffice it to say that if objects are bundles of tropes, this creates 
some pressure to say that they ontologically depend on these tropes. I’m not alone in 
with this verdict: Koslicki (2012: 189, f4), too, notes that bundle theorists with 
reductive ambitions should claim that it’s the bearers that ontologically dependent on 
their tropes, rather than the other way round. 
In conclusion, we can say that the claim that (at least contingent) tropes 
ontologically depend on their bearers seems the least plausible if tropes are both 
transferable and constituents of the objects they are tropes of, and the most plausible 
if neither is the case. This meshes not only with Deflationism, but also with the 
thinking of actual trope theorists. 
D. Facts and their constituents. Structured propositions, facts and events are 
often thought to ontologically depend on their constituents.33 For simplicity’s sake I 
will focus on facts, but much of what I have to say also applies to other structured 
compounds. Take the fact that John loves Mary – in usual notation: [John loves 
Mary]. This fact has as constituents John, the relation of loving, and Mary. Why think 
it ontologically depends on them? For one, the fact is constructed out of these things 
(perhaps by having them as parts, perhaps by a sui generis fact-constituency relation). 
For another, the fact has these constituents necessarily: [John loves Mary] cannot 
exist unless John, Mary and the loving relation do (the reverse isn’t true: John, Mary 
and loving could exist without [John loves Mary] existing). So both a constructive and 
                                                
32 Williams (1953), Campbell (1990) 
33 See Fine (1995), Thomasson (1999: 26), Correia (2008: 115), Koslicki (2012), among others. 
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a modal dependence factor speak in favour of facts ontologically depending on their 
constituents. (As Fine points out, there is two-way necessitation in the case of 
existential facts: [Socrates exists] exists iff Socrates does (1995: 271). Likewise for 
facts involving individuals and their necessary properties. I’m happy to concede these 
points, since (1) the constructive dependence factor still holds, which – along with a 
saturated modal dimension - might be enough to secure the facts-on-constituents 
direction, and (2) it does strike me as somewhat less obvious that such facts 
ontologically depend on their constituents than that ordinary ones do.) 
Not everyone accepts this view. Armstrong (1997) also believes in structured 
facts, but he often seems to take them to be basic things. How can we reconcile this 
with Armstrong’s “Tractarian” ambitions? Barnes (forthcoming) has recently 
suggested that we interpret Armstrong as defending the view that facts and their 
constituents ontologically depend on each other. Instead I would argue that 
Armstrong has been misled by his doctrine of ontological free lunch, according to 
which supervenient entities are “no addition of being”. More precisely, (1) he thinks 
that supervenience is sufficient for (something in the vicinity of) ontological 
dependence, but (2) uses a mistaken definition of supervenience, which (3) leads to 
an implausible view about ontological dependence. Armstrong uses the following 
definition of supervenience: 
 
‘[E]ntity Q supervenes upon entity P if and only if it is impossible that P 
should exist and Q not exist, where P is possible’ (1997: 11) 
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As Bricker (2006: 267–8) notes, this definition is fairly non-standard. Supervenience 
is usually understood as a covariance relation, but Armstrong’s definition is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for any interesting kind of covariance.  
In fact, Armstrong’s definition identifies supervenience with the right-hand side 
of the Modal Analysis, supplemented with an extra possibility condition. This is 
remarkable because it means that whenever the Modal Analysis predicts that A 
depends on B, Armstrong’s view will predict that B depends on A. It shouldn’t be 
surprising, then, that his verdict about facts and their constituents also runs counter 
to orthodoxy: this is to be expected when something close to the once-standard 
definition of ontological dependence is used to define the converse of the same 
relation! For this reason, I think that given his other views Armstrong was simply 
wrong to think that a fact’s constituents depended on that fact.34 
However, this doesn’t mean that “facts first” views can’t be defended. One 
could do so by denying that facts are structured in the first place. This is exactly the 
view of Turner (2016: Ch. 1), who has recently tried to place a broadly Tractarian 
approach on firmer footing. While Turner doesn’t quite say that individuals and 
properties ontologically depend on facts in my narrow sense of ‘ontological 
dependence’ (he doesn’t even officially commit himself to individuals and 
properties), he clearly denies that the dependence holds in the other direction. From 
a deflationary perspective, he has grounds for doing so: once we deny that facts are 
structured, the only remaining dependence factor speaking in favour of the 
dependence of facts on objects and properties will be asymmetric rigid necessitation. 
                                                
34 See Ellis (2001: 65) for a similar criticism. 
 27 
	
And at that point the deflationist can insist, with some plausibility, that there are too 
many unsaturated dependence dimensions for such dependence to obtain. 
This closes my discussion of particular cases. I obviously couldn’t give a 
complete overview, and some readers will inevitably feel that they had problem cases 
I haven’t discussed. For now, we can at least conclude that Deflationism does a good 
job explaining why widely cited cases of ontological dependence are plausible, and 
why others are more controversial. 
 
5. Two arguments for Deflationism 
Above I argued that Deflationism explained some widely cited, as well as some more 
controversial, cases of ontological dependence. I will now build on this conclusion to 
give two positive arguments for Deflationism. 
 
5.1. The epistemic argument 
In the various first-order debates, modal and constructive relations are widely 
regarded as evidentially relevant to the direction of ontological dependence. Yet few 
think that the presence of any of these relations by itself settles what depends 
ontologically on what. Deflationism explains this practice: the dependence factors 
constitute evidence in favour of dependence claims because ontological dependence 
aggregates them; yet none of these relations settles the presence and direction of 
ontological dependence, since ontological dependence doesn’t require any particular 
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relation in the cluster. So, we have reason to think that Deflationism is true. Call this 
the epistemic argument.35 
Now, I’m not claiming that Deflationism is the only way to make sense of the 
evidential role of the relations I consider dependence factors. But it provides an 
especially simple explanation and uses less controversial resources than rival views. 
For example, Fine understands both necessity (1994) and ontological dependence 
(1995) in terms of essence. While this view might explain the evidential relevance of 
necessitation to ontological dependence, it does so at the cost of relying on a 
controversial non-modal notion of essence. Moreover, it does little to explain the 
evidential relevance of constructive relations. 
The epistemic argument also highlights an advantage of my view over 
Deflationary Pluralism, which treats the dependence factors are species of ontological 
dependence. Deflationary Pluralism explains why certain relations are evidentially 
relevant to ontological dependence but yields a radically revisionary view about their 
evidential weight. Few think, for instance, that the mereological facts alone settle 
whether wholes ontologically depend on their proper parts (otherwise we couldn’t 
make sense of the debate over priority monism). My view, by contrast, implies only 
that if x is a part of y but not vice versa, this counts in favour of y ontologically 
                                                
35 Bennett (2017: 141–3) gives a similar argument against primitivism about relative fundamentality in 
the context of building relations. Like many others, Bennett draws no sharp distinction between 
dependence and determination, and her notion of building is meant to have some features of both. 
Wilson (2014) defends a similar view about grounding as a disjunction of “small-g” grounding 
relations; she too uses ‘grounding’ and ‘dependence’-talk interchangeably. 
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depending on x, but other factors might ultimately render the dependence claim 
false. If priority monism is true, this is exactly the case with the cosmos and its parts. 
 
5.2. The argument from formal properties 
In this section, I will demonstrate two further advantages of Dependence 
Deflationism. First, it can stay neutral on the formal properties of ontological 
dependence. Second, it can explain why philosophers often disagree about these 
formal properties. 
Ontological dependence is widely thought to be asymmetric: for any x and y, if x 
ontologically depends on y then y doesn’t ontologically depend on x.36 But in some 
conceivable cases x bears R to y, y bears R’ to x, and both R and R’ are dependence 
factors. A deflationary pluralist who takes the dependence factors to be species of 
ontological dependence cannot avoid concluding, then, that x and y ontologically 
depend on each other. For example, perhaps the cosmos is composed by some 
atoms, which rigidly necessitate the cosmos.37 Or perhaps properties conceived as 
Aristotelian universals generically necessitate their instances (they cannot exist 
uninstantiated), but the instances rigidly necessitate at least their essential 
properties.38 
                                                
36 See Lowe (1994), Cameron (2008), and Koslicki (2013), among others. 
37 Bennett (2017: 26–9) raises a similar worry about the general notion of building. See also her 
discussion of why it’s not a promising strategy to insist that only one species of building can hold 
between any two relata; the same considerations apply to ontological dependence. 
38 Lowe (1994) 
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One answer to these worries is that ontological dependence simpliciter is a very 
general relation, so it’s not that bad if it fails to be asymmetric. What matters is that 
each species of ontological dependence is asymmetric, and with sufficiently fine-
grained distinctions, we can ensure that no two things bear the same species of 
ontological dependence to each other (e.g., the standard answer in the second case is 
to say that Aristotelian universals generically depend on their instances, which in turn 
rigidly depend on their essential properties).39 
I don’t see how this response addresses the main worry. Compare is bigger than. 
George the Great Dane is taller, but narrower, then Mike the Mastiff; yet they aren’t 
bigger than each other. If someone thought they were, it wouldn’t help to emphasize 
that the specific comparative size relations they bear to each other are asymmetric; this 
wouldn’t by itself make the intuition that is bigger than is also asymmetric go away. 
The same goes for ontological dependence. If we started out with an asymmetry 
intuition about a particular case, it’s unclear why this intuition should go away just 
because ontological dependence is a general relation comprising more fine-grained 
asymmetric species. 
Deflationism can reconcile the possibility of opposing dependence factors with 
the asymmetry of ontological dependence. Let me immediately add that we don’t need 
to assume that ontological dependence is asymmetric. So far I have been assuming 
that it is, but Deflationism also allows us to make sense of revisionary views. 
Roughly, we can distinguish three positions in the extant literature: (a) ontological 
dependence is asymmetric, (b) it isn’t asymmetric, and not even antisymmetric: some 
                                                
39 See Lowe (1994: 38–40), Fine (1995: 286), and Correia (2005: 45, f11); cf. Bennett (2017: 27–8). 
 31 
	
things ontologically depend on each other; and finally, (c) ontological dependence is 
antisymmetric but reflexive: everything trivially depends on itself. All along I have 
been assuming (a), but this choice wasn’t mandatory. 
Deflationism can accommodate (b)-type views, since nothing in the notion of an 
aggregative cluster requires such concepts to be asymmetric. Is bigger than is 
asymmetric, but is at least as big as isn’t. If ontological dependence were more like the 
latter, it could allow for mutual dependence. Better yet, once we recognize that 
aggregative clusters needn’t be asymmetric, we can help ourselves to a conciliatory 
resolution of the dispute between (a) and (b)-type views. ‘Ontological dependence’ 
displays a certain amount of indeterminacy: there are several abundant relations that 
could have been meant by it, some of which allow for symmetric aggregation while 
others rule it out. Perhaps the linguistic conventions favour one candidate over the 
other. Even so, the rival party’s mistake is fairly superficial, and they are free to just 
stipulate a notion of ontological dependence with the desired formal properties. This 
resolution dovetails nicely with many putative examples of symmetric dependence, 
which usually cite opposing dependence factors.40, 41 
                                                
40 This is the case, I believe, with many of Barnes’s (forthcoming) putative examples of symmetric 
dependence, though I lack space to go over them in any detail here. 
41 One might worry that no notion of ontological dependence is asymmetric. Take a (simplified) toy 
model according to which the dependence factors are R1, R2 and R3, and something ontologically 
depends on another thing if the former bears a majority of dependence factors to the latter. Then we 
can construct a case in which x bears R1 and R2 to y, y bears R1 and R3 to z, and z bears R2 and R3 to 
x. The rules of aggregation and the transitivity of ontological dependence imply a violation of 
asymmetry (as well as irreflexivity). I think this objection does show something significant: the rules of 
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What about (c)-type views? I stipulated that each dependence factor was 
asymmetric, but we can cook up a concept – ontological dependence*, say – that 
aggregates non-symmetric modal and constructive relations, for example proper-or-
improper parthood and (non-symmetric) rigid and generic necessitation. Presumably, 
everything bears to itself a significant subset of these “dependence* factors”, so it’s 
plausible that everything ontologically depends* on itself. The debate between (a)- 
and (b)-type views can thus be understood as one about whether ‘ontological 
dependence’ means ontological dependence or ontological dependence*. Although 
this diagnosis implies that the participants themselves misconceive the nature of their 
debate (they think they are talking about the same relation, but they aren’t), I find it 
attractive.42 While most philosophers assume that ontological dependence is 
irreflexive and asymmetric, others write as if it was obvious that everything depended 
                                                                                                                                
aggregation won’t by themselves ensure the asymmetry of an aggregative cluster concept. However, 
that doesn’t mean that we cannot rule out such loops on an independent basis. Let’s assume (for 
simplicity’s sake) that the three factors are rigid asymmetric necessitation, irreflexive parthood, and 
ancestral set membership. Suppose x rigidly asymmetrically necessitates y and y is a proper part of x, 
and y rigidly asymmetrically necessitates z and z is an ancestral member of y. To complete the loop, z 
would need to be both a part and an ancestral member of x, which seems impossible. While I lack 
space to go through every logically possible combination of dependence factors, I’m yet to be 
convinced that we can find one that yields a loop. (Thanks to Mike Raven for raising this concern.) 
42 Elsewhere, I defended a similar diagnosis of putative cases of self-grounding as a trivial limiting 
case, rather than a genuine departure from the orthodox irreflexive conception; see Kovacs 
forthcoming. 
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on itself.43 Since everything plausibly ontologically depends* on itself, it’s natural to 
understand them as using ‘ontological dependence’ for ontological dependence*. 
Let me wrap up. There are various notions, guided by different rules of 
aggregation, which result in different constraints on the formal properties of 
ontological dependence. Which of these comes closest to the standing notion of 
ontological dependence is a question I cannot conclusively settle here, but the 
deflationary framework can explain why any of the extant views could appear 
reasonable to its proponents. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I attempted to spell out Dependence Deflationism in some detail and 
offered some reasons for taking it seriously. If the deflationary view is correct, we 
arguably shouldn’t structure our inquiries around the notion of ontological 
dependence, since the questions we formulate in terms of it could be asked and 
addressed with more precision in modal and constructive terms. If this were right, 
we would do well to excise ‘ontological dependence’ from our vocabulary and focus 
instead on the deeper philosophical questions that all along underlay our inquiries 
about dependence.44 
                                                
43 See Simons (1987: 295), Thomasson (1999: 26), and Tahko and Lowe (2015: §4.2). 
44 I’m grateful to Karen Bennett, Matti Eklund, and Ted Sider, who were generous enough to 
comment on and discuss with me numerous drafts of this paper. For helpful comments and 
discussion I’m also grateful to Fabrice Correia, Louis deRosset, Ghislain Guigon, James Lee, Kevin 
Mulligan, Mike Raven, Brad Saad, Nico Silins, Alex Skiles, Dean Zimmerman, anonymous referees, 
and audiences at the VIII Annual Mark L. Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference at Brown 
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